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Abstract
Iris recognition technologies are deployed in numerous large-scale nation-wide projects in order to provide robust
and reliable biometric recognition of individuals. Moreover, the iris has been found to be rather stable over time, i.e.
iris biometric reference data provides a strong and permanent link between individuals and their biometric traits.
Hence, unprotected storage of (iris) biometric data provokes serious privacy threats, e.g. identity theft, limited
re-newability, or cross-matching. Biometric cryptosystems grant a significant improvement in data privacy and
increase the likelihood that individuals will effectively consent in the biometric system usage. However, the vast
majority of proposed biometric cryptosystems do not guarantee desired properties of irreversibility, unlinkability, and
re-newability without significantly degrading the biometric performance.
In this work, we propose an unlinkable multi-instance iris biometric cryptosystem based on the improved fuzzy vault
scheme. The proposed system locks biometric feature sets extracted from binary iris biometric reference data, i.e.
iris-codes, of the left and right irises in a single fuzzy vault. In order to retain the size of the protected template and
authentication speed, the proposed fusion step combines the most discriminative parts of two iris-codes at feature
level. It is shown that the proposed key-binding process enables the generation of irreversible protected templates
which prevents from previously proposed cross-matching attacks. Further, we investigate the optimal choice among
potential decoding strategies with respect to biometric performance and time of key retrieval. The fully reproducible
system is integrated to two different publicly available iris recognition systems and evaluated on the CASIAv3-Interval
and the IITDv1 iris databases. Compared to the corresponding unprotected recognition schemes, genuine match
rates of approximately 95 and 97 % at which no false accepts are observed and maintained in a single- and
multi-instance scenario, respectively. Moreover, the multi-iris system is shown to significantly improve privacy
protection achieving security levels of approximately 70 bits at practical biometric performance.
Keywords: Biometrics, Iris recognition, Template protection, Multi-biometrics, Biometric cryptosystem, Fuzzy vault
scheme
1 Introduction
Biometrics refers to the automated recognition of individ-
uals based on their behavioral and biological characteris-
tics, e.g. fingerprint or face [1, 2]. It is generally conceded
that a substitute to biometrics for positive identifica-
tion in integrated security applications is non-existent. In
past decades, iris recognition [3, 4] emerged as a rapidly
growing field of research. Due to its intricate structure,
the iris constitutes one of the most powerful biomet-
ric characteristics. Existing approaches to iris recognition
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achieve auspicious biometric performance and deploy-
ments in diverse application scenarios, such as border
control, underline its tremendous impact [5]. On national-
sized biometric systems, the use of multiple biometric
characteristics has been found to significantly improve
the accuracy and reliability especially in challenging iden-
tification scenarios [6], while recognition systems based
on a single biometric indicator often have to contend
with unacceptable error rates [7]. However, improve-
ment in biometric performance as a result of biometric
fusion should be weighed against the associated overhead
involved, such as additional sensing cost, i.e. it is preferred
to combine biometric characteristics that can be acquired
in a single presentation [8]. For instance, in the Unique
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IDentification Authority of India (UIDAI) [9], which aims
at registering all 1.2 billion Indian citizens, both irises and
all fingers of a subject are acquired at enrollment. Similar
national projects are also under way in Indonesia and in
several smaller countries [10].
Generic iris recognition systems, see Fig. 1a, consist
of four major modules: (1) image acquisition; (2) pre-
processing; (3) feature extraction; and (4) comparison. At
image acquisition, good-quality NIR images are required
to provide a robust recognition, where most current
deployments require subjects to fully cooperate with the
system. At pre-processing, the pupil and the outer bound-
ary of the iris are detected. Subsequently, general iris
recognition algorithms transform the iris ring to a nor-
malized rectangular texture on which image enhancement
methods, e.g. histogram stretching, are applied. To com-
plete the pre-processing, the parts of the iris texture
which are occluded by eyelids, eyelashes, or reflections
are detected and stored in an according noise mask. The
vast majority of feature extraction algorithms follow the
approach of Daugman [3], in which a binary feature vec-
tor, i.e. iris-code, is extracted by applying adequate filters
to the iris texture in a row-wise manner. The data rep-
resentation based on an iris-code offers compact storage
and rapid Hamming distance-based (HD) comparison.
Recently, different researchers have shown that, in case
an attacker has full knowledge of the employed feature
extraction, iris-codes can be utilized in order to recon-
struct images of subjects’ iris textures [11, 12]. Such
images can be presented to an iris recognition system
in order to successfully launch presentation attacks [13].
In order to safeguard individuals’ privacy, protection
of biometric templates is of utmost importance, since
unprotected storage of biometric templates poses seri-
ous privacy threats. Technologies of biometric template
a
b
Fig. 1 Processing chains of a a conventional unprotected (multi-) iris
recognition system and of b the proposed (multi-) iris fuzzy vault
system
protection [14, 15], which are commonly categorized
as biometric cryptosystems [16] and cancelable biomet-
rics [17], offer solutions to privacy preserving biometric
authentication. Biometric cryptosystems are designed to
securely bind a digital key to a biometric or generate
a digital key from a biometric signal [16] in order to
meet the two major requirements of biometric template
protection defined in the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [18]: (1) irre-
versibility, i.e. knowledge of a protected template can not
be exploited to reconstruct a biometric sample which is
equal or close (within a small margin of error) to an orig-
inal captured sample of the same source; (2) unlinkability,
i.e. different versions of protected biometric templates
can be generated based on the same biometric data (re-
newability), while protected templates should not allow
cross-matching.
Apart from fulfilling the above properties, an ideal bio-
metric cryptosystem shall not cause a decrease in bio-
metric performance with respect to the corresponding
unprotected system [19]. The vast majority of existing
techniques do not satisfy desired template protection
requirements in practice, mostly resulting in a trade-off
between privacy protection and biometric performance
[20]. The incorporation of multiple biometric charac-
teristics to biometric cryptosystems has been found to
improve biometric performance [7], while the protection
of multi-biometric templates is especially crucial as they
contain information regarding multiple characteristics of
the same subject [21]. In contrast to conventional bio-
metric systems, where fusion may take place at score or
decision level [7], with respect to template protection
schemes, feature-level fusion has been identified as most
suitable. A separate storage of two or more protected
biometric templates would enable parallelized attacks. In
contrast, a single protected template, which has been
obtained by means of feature-level fusion, is expected
to improve privacy protection, since the fused template
comprises more biometric information [21]. This is anal-
ogous to an access control system which requires multi-
ple low strength (few bits) keys, where each key can be
attacked individually. Such a system is less secure than
one which uses a single key with a larger number of
bits. Obviously, the development of multi-biometric cryp-
tosystems is accompanied by further issues such as com-
mon data representation, storage requirement, or feature
alignment [22].
1.1 Contribution of work
In this work, we present an unlinkable multi-biometric
iris-cryptosystem based on the fuzzy vault scheme [23].
As shown in Fig. 1b, one property of the proposed scheme
is that it can be seamlessly integrated to an existing iris
recognition system. Since it is designed to protect iris-
codes, a re-enrolment of already registered subjects is
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not required, in contrast to proposed iris-based fuzzy
vault schemes (see Section 2), which build upon spe-
cific feature extractors. The presented scheme is extended
to a multi-iris template protection scheme where bio-
metric fusion takes place at feature level, in order to
maximize privacy protection. In order to minimize pro-
cessing time as well as storage requirement, the fusion
process is designed to retain the size of a single protected
template. Tomaximize the entropy, and hence discrimina-
tivity, of the fused template, the most reliable feature parts
of two iris-codes are combined, and based on a detailed
investigation of decoding strategies, we choose an ideal
trade-off between computational and biometric perfor-
mance. Thereby, authentication times, which are of equal
magnitude for single- and multi-iris fuzzy vaults, are kept
low while accuracy is significantly improved.
The proposed system, which is evaluated on two pub-
licly available iris databases for different iris biometric
feature extractors, maintains biometric performance of
corresponding unprotected baseline systems. In addi-
tion, security analysis show that the system is resis-
tant to existing cross-matching attacks and provides
cryptographically acceptable security levels confirming
the soundness of the presented approach.
1.2 Organisation of article
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2 briefly summarizes related works regarding
iris biometric cryptosystems and the fuzzy vault scheme.
Section 3 provides a detailed description of key com-
ponents of the proposed unlinkable improved (multi-)
biometric iris fuzzy vault. Experiments are presented in
Section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Related work
2.1 Iris biometric cryptosystems
Among conceptual proposals [24, 25], the first implemen-
tation of an iris biometric cryptosystem, in which the
fuzzy commitment scheme is employed [26], was pre-
sented in [27]. The fuzzy commitment scheme by Juels
and Wattenberg [26] represents a cryptographic primi-
tive, which combines techniques from the area of error
correcting codes and cryptography. At key-binding, a pre-
chosen key is prepared with error correcting codes and
bound to a binary biometric feature vector of the same
length by XORing both resulting in a difference vector.
In addition, a hash of the key is stored together with the
difference vector forming the commitment. During key
retrieval, another binary feature vector is XORed with the
stored difference vector and error correction decoding is
applied. In case the presented feature vector is sufficiently
“close” to the stored one, the correct key is returned,
which can be tested using the stored hash. In [27], 2048-
bit iris-codes are applied to bind and retrieve 140-bit keys
prepared with Hadamard and Reed-Solomon error cor-
rection codes. On an in-house dataset comprising 700
iris images of 70 subjects, a FNMR of 0.47 % at a zero
FMR is reported. To provide a more efficient error correc-
tion decoding in an iris-based fuzzy commitment scheme,
two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding was intro-
duced in [28] achieving a FNMR of 5.62 % at a zero FMR
on the ICE 2005 iris database [29], where bound keys con-
sist of 40 bits. A context-based reliable component selec-
tion used to extract keys from iris-codes which are then
bound to Hadamard codewords is presented in [30]. Fur-
ther, diverse techniques to improve the performance and
security of (iris) fuzzy commitment schemes have been
proposed, e.g. [31–34]. In [35, 36], different attacks have
been suggested, which utilize the fact that error correc-
tion codes underlie distinct structures. Statistical attacks
based on so-called error correction code histograms have
been successfully conducted against iris-based fuzzy com-
mitment schemes in [37]. In [38], it was found that fuzzy
commitment schemes leak information in bound keys
and non-uniform templates. Suggestions to prevent from
information leakage in fuzzy commitment schemes have
been proposed in [39]. In addition, attacks via record mul-
tiplicity could be applied to decode stored commitments
[40, 41]. In [33], a bit-permutation process was introduced
to prevent from cross-matching attacks. It is, however,
important to note that even if one uses record-specific
bit-permutation processes, cross-matching may still be
possible for records protecting very similar feature vectors
and then even enables reversibility attacks from record
multiplicity [42]. Considering proposed attacks, the secu-
rity provided by iris-based fuzzy commitment is rather
doubtable.
Focusing on iris, the first implementation of a fuzzy
vault scheme (see Section 2.2) was presented in [43, 44]
in which salient feature points are extracted from iris tex-
tures. Based on several enrolment samples, independent
component analysis and k-means clustering is employed
to extract 16 coefficients from most stable parts of
the iris textures. On the BERC [45] and the CASIAv3-
Interval iris database [46], a GMR of approximately 99 and
80 %, respectively, was achieved at a zero FMR employ-
ing 128 bit keys. In order to prevent from attacks via
record multiplicity, an iris fuzzy vault which is hard-
ened with an additional password is presented in [47, 48].
Image enhancement techniques are applied to extract iris
fibres from which minutiae-like coordinates are extracted.
Experiments are reported for the CASIAv1 [49] and the
MMU iris database [50] achieving a GMR of at most 90 %
at a zero FMR. In [51], a multi-biometric fuzzy vault based
on fingerprint and iris is proposed. Secret keys, which
are used to generate an iris-based fuzzy commitment,
are directly encoded, fused with fingerprint data at fea-
ture level, and locked in the fuzzy vault scheme, achieving
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a GMR of approximately 98 % at a FMR of 0.01 % on
the in-house MSU-DBI fingerprint [52] and the CASIAv1
iris database [49] for a key size of 208 bit. However, the
scheme requires an additional storage of corresponding
difference vectors which allows for previously mentioned
attacks. Further proposal of iris fuzzy vaults, e.g. [53–55],
omit a detailed description of employed iris feature encod-
ing or experimental protocols.
The majority of proposed approaches to iris biomet-
ric cryptosystems lack a thorough security analysis. It
is important to note that the length of employed keys
in biometric cryptosystems represents only an upper
bound for the provided security. For instance, the scheme
in [27], which is designed to bind and retrieve 140
bit keys, provides a security of approximately 40 bits
[51]. This reduction is mainly caused by dependencies
among neighbouring iris-code bits resulting in a large
entropy loss.
Apart from iris biometric cryptosystems, different
approaches to cancelable iris biometrics have been pro-
posed, e.g. [56–60]. For further details on cancelable iris
biometrics, the reader is referred to [15, 61].
2.2 Fuzzy vault scheme
By design, the fuzzy vault scheme [23, 62] enables pro-
tection and error-tolerant verification with feature sets.
It is due to this property that led researchers to consider
the fuzzy vault scheme as a promising tool for protecting
fingerprint minutiae sets [63]. This preliminary analysis
was followed by a series of working implementations for
fingerprints most of which are minutiae-based [64, 65].
However, the fuzzy vault scheme as proposed by Juels and
Sudan is vulnerable to a certain kind of linkage attacks, the
correlation attack [66, 67], that very clearly conflicts with
the unlinkability requirement and (even worst) with the
irreversibility requirement of effective biometric template
protection. Moreover, the use of public unprotected aux-
iliary alignment data can ease an attacker in performing
linkage attacks. As a countermeasure, an implementation
for absolutely pre-aligned minutiae that avoids any corre-
lation between related records of the fuzzy vault scheme
has been proposed [68]. Another advantage from the con-
struction in [68] is that the improved fuzzy vault scheme
by Dodis et al. [69] can be used for template protec-
tion which results in significantly more compact record
sizes. Compared to earlier works [63, 64], security lev-
els have been revealed to be approximately 40 bits for
single-finger fuzzy vaults. It is important to note that
other linkage attacks can be applied to the improved
fuzzy vault scheme but they can, however, be effectively
avoided [70].
It is a widely accepted hypothesis that the fingerprint
modality does not contain a sufficient amount of effec-
tive entropy to resist attacks exploiting the distribution
of fingerprint features, specifically false-accept attacks.
From this perspective, we should increase the amount of
entropy by considering implementations for fused tem-
plates extracted from more than one finger of a person
[71] or, as a promising alternative, consider other biomet-
ric modalities such as a person’s iris(es).
When designing a fuzzy vault-based cryptosystem, a
practical decoding strategy is needed. Though, in the orig-
inal fuzzy vault [23, 62], a Reed-Solomon decoder [72]
has been proposed, its resulting error-correcting capa-
bilities are not sufficient to achieve a practical imple-
mentation for single finger. As a consequence, the use of
a Lagrange-based decoder has been proposed [64] and
adopted for other single-finger implementations [65, 68].
A multi-finger implementation has been proposed in [71].
If a Lagrange-based decoder was chosen for the imple-
mentation, then the decoding complexity would become
infeasible. A reasonable trade-off between decoding time
and verification performance can be achieved using a
Guruswami-Sudan-based decoder [71, 73] of which a
Reed-Solomon decoder can be viewed as a special case. In
this paper, these strategies are considered for key retrieval
in Section 3.4.
3 Proposed system
3.1 From iris-codes to feature sets
As aforementioned, conventional iris recognition schemes
extract two-dimensional binary feature vectors, i.e. iris-
codes, from iris images [3, 4], cf. Fig. 5. Since the fuzzy
vault scheme operates on feature sets, the first process-
ing step of the proposed system represents a feature
type transformation [74], in particular a binary-to-integer
ordered-to-unordered transformation. In our scheme, an
extracted iris-code is vertically divided into B blocks of
size w × h bits, where each block, and hence each col-
umn, is associated with a block index b = 0, . . . ,B − 1.
Subsequently, transform f is applied to each column ci ∈
{0, 1}h, i = 0, . . . ,w − 1, of a block with index b, f (ci, b) =
int(ci) · log2 B + b, where int denotes the conversion of
a binary vector to its integer representation. Each block
yields a vector Vb of feature values, Vb = (v0, . . . , vw−1),
with vi = f (ci, b). For each vector, Vb,Pb denotes the
sets of unique vector elements, Pb = {v0, . . . , vl}=, l ≤
w. The set-based representation conceals the ordering of
columns within each block; in addition, multiple entries
are discarded. Since iris-code bits are not mutually inde-
pendent [3], correlation between (neighbouring) columns
is expected. Hence, a certain amount of columns within
each processed block will be identical, as will be shown in
experiments; see Section 4. Let |Pb| = l be the number
of unique feature values of a transformed iris-code block.
For a potential attacker, the reconstruction of the origi-
nal iris-code block involves an arranging of l codewords
to w positions. The degree of irreversibility provided by
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transform f could be quantified by the number of possi-










which follows from a simple application of the inclusion-
exclusion principle. Large values of  prevent an attacker
from reconstructing (guessing) corresponding original
iris-code blocks, which further improves privacy protec-
tion. It is important to note that, in contrast to finger-
prints, where approximations of original fingerprints can
be reconstructed fromminutiae coordinates [75], this esti-
mation only applies to the use of iris-codes. The final set
of feature values P is estimated as the union of all sets of
unique vector elements of all blocks, P = ⋃B−1b=0 Pb, where
|P| = ∑B−1b=0 |Pb|, since each block index b is unique.
The entire procedure of generating P from an iris-code is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
In the comparison stage, generic iris recognition sys-
tems apply circular bit shifts and estimate HD scores
at different shifting positions, i.e. relative tilt angles, in
order to compensate for head tilts. The minimal obtained
HD, which corresponds to an optimal alignment, rep-
resents the final score. It is important to note that the
number of shifting positions employed to determine an
appropriate alignment between pair of iris-codesmay vary
depending on the application scenario. The proposed set-
based representation is alignment-free to a certain extent,
since equal columns within certain blocks are mapped
Fig. 2 Proposed iris-code to feature set transform: based on binary
columns of a block and its corresponding block index, the transform f
extracts feature elements from which a set of unique feature
elements are generated. For example, for B = 8, column
011001102 = 102, and index 0012 = 1, we get f (102, 1) = 817
to identical feature values. Hence, self-propagating errors
caused by an inappropriate alignment of iris-codes are
eliminated (radial neighbourhoods persist). The rotation-
compensating property of the proposed system comes at
the cost of location information of iris-code columns. In
case iris-codes are strongly misaligned, columns will end
up in different blocks yielding different feature sets. How-
ever, as will be shown in experiments, in case of iris images
captured under favourable conditions, the proposed rep-
resentationmaintains distinctiveness ifw and h are chosen
appropriately.
3.2 Multi-instance single-algorithm fusion
An overview of the multi-instance single-algorithm
fusion, which is designed to fuse biometric informa-
tion extracted from the left and right iris of a subject,
is depicted in Fig. 3. The proposed fusion technique is
motivated by two facts:
1. Average decoding times generally increase with the
size of a fuzzy vault. Hence, a fusion of the most
discriminative parts of two iris-codes to one of the
size of a single iris-code is preferable, in order to
maintain reasonable decoding times.
2. Upper and lower iris parts are frequently occluded by
eyelids or eyelashes, cf. Fig. 4 (even under active
participation of captured subjects). It has been found
that the use of a general noise mask reveals
performance gains comparable to that obtained by
subject-specific masks [76].
In order to extract discriminative and stable feature sets
of reasonable size, iris-code parts which originate from
Fig. 3 Proposed multi-instance fusion: iris-code bits originating from
upper and lower iris parts are discarded and remaining iris-code
chunks are concatenated prior to extracting to extracting feature sets
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Fig. 4 Sample pairs of left and right 320 × 240 pixel NIR iris images of
the IITDv1 Iris Database (numbers in captions refer to identifiers). It can
be observed that upper and lower iris parts are frequently occluded by
eyelids and eyelashes
upper and lower iris parts (marked grey in Fig. 3) are
discarded. Discarding iris-code blocks originating from
those parts represents a static way of extracting half of the
bits expected to be rather stable, which does not require
the storage of any auxiliary data. Note that additional
subject-specific data pointing at most reliable iris-code
parts might enable linkage attacks. The resulting iris-code
parts of the left and right iris of width w × K/2 are
concatenated, resulting in a single iris-code of dimension
equal to that of an iris-code extracted from a single image
(without deleting upper and lower iris-code parts). The
stability of selected iris-code parts will be empirically anal-
ysed in experiments; see Section 4. Finally, the previously
described method is employed to extract a single feature
set. The presented feature-level fusion does not affect the
size of the vault compared to single-instance scenario and,
at the same time, retains biometric information expected
to be most discriminative [4].
The proposed multi-instance fusion technique requires
irises to be aligned properly. However, nowadays, iris
sensors are capable of acquiring the left and right irises
of a subject simultaneously (using two sensors), which
results in an implicit alignment of both irises. More-
over, it is generally conceded that favorable acquisition
conditions are considered a fundamental premise for bio-
metric template protection [14]. Hence, the suggested
trivial concatenation of iris-code parts is expected to pre-
serve the alignment-free representation of subsequently
processed iris-code blocks. Other fusion techniques, e.g.
a random shuffling or interleaving of iris-code columns,
would obscure neighbourhoods of columns within
iris-code blocks and, thus, are expected to decrease the
biometric performance of the system.
3.3 Key binding
In the first step of the binding process, a secret polyno-
mial κ ∈ F[X] of degree smaller than k is chosen, and
the hash SHA(κ) is stored. Given a feature set P, extracted
from both or a single iris image(s) of a subject, SHA(κ)
is used as seed for a record-specific but public bijection
σ : F → F, which is applied to re-map the elements of
P, Pˆ = σ(P) = {σ(v)|v ∈ P}. This step is performed in
order to prevent from the attack proposed in [70], which is
based on the extended Euclidean algorithm. Let V (X) and
W (X) be two related vault records protecting the feature
sets P and P′, respectively; unlinkability can be attacked
efficiently and effectively, provided that
|P ∩ P′| ≥ (max(|P|, |P′|) + k)/2. (2)
In [70], it is also shown that the probability of Eq. 2
can be destroyed by applying the abovementioned re-
mapping of feature elements. Note that the employment
of these public maps does not affect the operational per-
formance of the system.Moreover, as σ is generated based
on SHA(κ), no additional data storage is required. Due to
the assumed randomness of two maps σ and σ ′, the cor-
responding sets σ(P) and σ ′(P′) are random and, based
on the definition of the hyper-geometric distribution, the














where ω0 = 	(|P| + k)/2
, ρ = 2h+log2 B, and w.l.o.g. |P| ≥
|P′|. In experiments, it will be shown that the probability
of Eq. 3 is sufficiently low in a cryptographic sense; see
Section 4.
The next step is performed based on the improved fuzzy
vault scheme [69], which improves the original construc-
tion bymeans that it generates significantly more compact
records. In the improved fuzzy vault, scheme genuine and
chaff feature elements are encoded by a monic polyno-
mial of degree t = |Pˆ|. The features in Pˆ, interpreted as
elements of a finite field F where |F| = ρ, are bound to
the secret polynomial κ by computing V (X) = κ(X) +∏
v∈Pˆ(X−v), such that the pair (V (X), SHA(κ)) builds our
final record.
All elements of Pˆ represent columns consisting of
exactly h + log2 B bits. The size of the vault increases
with t and is upper bounded by the width of processed
iris-codes, i.e. |V (X)| ≤ 512(h + log2 B) bits. In order to
obscure the size of the vault, which might leak informa-
tion about the protected iris-code, an additional zero-bit
is appended to each element in Pˆ. Subsequently, random
values, for which this additional bit is set to 1, are added to
Pˆ until a desiredmaximum vault size is reached. Themax-
imum vault size might be defined as 512(h + 1 + log2 B)
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bits or by a maximum observed vault size maxn∈N tn(h +
1 + log2 B), where N is the number of registered subjects.
It is important to note that the correlation attack
[66, 67], which is a special linkage attack, cannot be
applied due to the fact that the improved fuzzy vault
scheme encodes a maximal number of chaff points. In
such a way, no correlation can be exploited between fea-
ture sets protected by two (or more) related instances of
the applied fuzzy vault records.
3.4 Polynomial reconstruction strategy and key retrieval
On authentication, an unlocking set U ⊂ F × F of size
u is built containing ω pairs being interpolated by the
polynomial κ ; we call these pairs genuine. If ω ≥ k, then
it is possible to reconstruct the polynomial κ from U if
we assume that we can verify the correctness of κ , e.g.
by using the hash value SHA(κ). It may, however, not
be feasible to reconstruct κ from U in case ω ≥ k. For
example, we found from our training (see Section 4.2) that
we can expect the unlocking set to be of size u ≈ 300;
furthermore, if we want to achieve a practical genuine
acceptance rate, we need to be able to successfully recover
κ from U when it contains ω = 100 genuine pairs. In the
following, we discuss different recovery strategies for this
representative example to find a reasonable decoder.
3.4.1 Iterated Lagrange strategy
One way to reconstruct κ from U is to select k pairs
from U and compute the unique polynomial κ∗ of degree
smaller than k that interpolates them. If all k selected pairs
are genuine, then κ∗ = κ which can be verified with over-
whelming reliability by observing SHA(κ∗) = SHA(κ).
If not all k selected pairs are genuine, then most likely
SHA(κ∗) = SHA(κ) and we may repeat the procedure
until SHA(κ∗) = SHA(κ). This procedure is guaranteed
to, eventually, reveal the secret polynomial κ if ω ≥ k











However, the procedure can become very impractical to
be performed. For instance, if u = 300,ω = 100, and k =
20, then we have to expect to run 234 iterations before κ
is recovered. This is too costly for a practical polynomial
reconstruction strategy.
3.4.2 Iterated Reed-Solomon strategy
Alternatively, we may apply a Reed-Solomon decoder (e.g.
see [72]). This class of algorithms is capable of recovering
κ from U efficiently (by means of deterministic polyno-
mial time) if ω ≥ (u+k)/2. On the other hand, these class
of algorithms will fail to recover κ from U for ω < (u +
k)/2. In order to establish a decoding mechanism reason-
ably dealing with these cases, it is conceivable to choose
a c-sized subset U0 ⊂ U randomly where |U| ≥ c ≥ k,
apply the Reed-Solomon decoder toU0, and if successfully
revealing κ∗ with SHA(κ∗) = SHA(κ), output the recov-
ered polynomial; otherwise, the procedure is repeated up
to a predefined number of steps. This mechanismwill suc-
ceed eventually if ω ≥ (c+ k)/2 which improves upon the
bound ω ≥ (u+ k)/2 since c ≥ u. The success probability
for a single step of the procedure is equal to















If in addition, the time zRS(c, k) for a single itera-
tion is known, then the expected time for the iterated
Reed-Solomon strategy to successfully recover κ can be
calculated as
log(0.5)
log(1 − pRS(c,ω, k, c)) · zRS(c, k). (6)
In order to assess feasibility of the iterated Reed-
Solomon decoding strategy, we consider our case example
where (u,ω, k) = (300, 100, 20). For each c = k, ..., 2ω − k
computed with Eq. (5), we applied an experimentally sup-
ported analysis on the estimated effort for the iterated
Reed-Solomon decoding strategy to successfully decode
the vault. For each c, we measured the time zRS(c, k) a
Reed-Solomon decoder applied to an unlocking set of size
c would consume and estimated the expected time for a
successful recovery using Eq. (6). We found that for c =
36, the effort becomes minimal with zRS(c, k) being very
close to zero and pRS(u,ω, k, c) ≈ 2−27. Yet, even though
significantly improving upon the iterated Lagrange decod-
ing strategy, an effort of 27 bits is still too costly for a
practical implementation.
3.4.3 Iterated Guruswami-Sudan strategy
The bound ω ≥ (u + k)/2 can be significantly improved
by applying a Guruswami-Sudan algorithm [73]. This class
of algorithms can potentially recover κ from U provided
that ω >
√
u · (k − 1). However, in practice, implemen-
tations of the Guruswami-Sudan decoder may be too
time-consuming if one aims at recovering exactly up to
u − √u · (k − 1) errors. The number of errors that one
can tolerate depends on an additional parameter con-
trolling input to a Guruswami-Sudan algorithm called
multiplicity. The higher the multiplicity, the more errors
the algorithm can tolerate while also being more inef-
ficient. The lower the multiplicity, the more efficient is
the algorithm but being able to tolerate fewer errors, e.g.
≈ u − √2 · u · (k − 1) for a single multiplicity. Yet, this
can still be a significant improvement as compared to a
Reed-Solomon decoder.
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In the same way as for the iterated Reed-Solomon strat-
egy, we could apply an iterated Guruswami-Sudan strategy
which, given u,ω, k, and c, will recover κ fromU in a single
step with probability














For (u,ω, k) = (300, 100, 20) we found that c = 297
yields the best iterated Guruswami-Sudan strategy (for a
single multiplicity) where each step consumes zGS(c, k)
time (a fraction of a second on a standard workstation,
see Section 4.3) with success probability pGS(u,ω, k, c) ≈
0.96 %. It has furthermore been measured that a single
step is approximately 29 times harder to perform than
a single Lagrange interpolation. This results in an over-
all difficulty to recover κ from U with more than 95 %
probability of only 9 bits and clearly shows that this strat-
egy outperforms the iterated Lagrange and Reed-Solomon
strategy.
3.4.4 Proposed strategy
The different decoding strategies that we discussed above
have been tested for (u,ω, k) = (300, 100, 20) which is
a typical property of an unlocking set being built on a
genuine verification. Since a Guruswami-Sudan strategy
clearly is the best choice from the above experiments, we
choose a Guruswami-Sudan strategy. Furthermore, since
c ≈ u has been found as the optimal choice, we will
only apply a single step of the Guruswami-Sudan algo-
rithm to the entire unlocking setU and no subsets thereof.
Moreover, we use a multiplicity of three which yields a
decoder with a reasonable trade-off of error tolerance and
decoding time, i.e. less than a second [71].
Our discussion emphasizes that it is hard to choose an
optimal polynomial recovery strategy, mainly due to the
fact that one can either optimize the decoding time or
the success probability but not both (unless a predefined
trade-off between the two criteria can be selected). From
our discussion, we have chosen the final decoding strat-
egy from experimental observations and a final educated
guess. However, it must be stressed that a Guruswami-
Sudan strategy is not necessarily the best strategy. For
example, whenever one wants to successfully decode even
if ω = k, then the iterated Lagrange strategy is optimal,
and if ω ≥ (u + k)/2, then the Reed-Solomon decoding
strategy yields to the best decoder. It seems therefore rea-
sonable to develop a dynamic decoder switching between
different strategies depending on the expected values for
ω given u and k. This is an interesting topic; the analy-
sis of which we leave open for future research. The reader
should be aware of the fact that from an attacker’s point
of view, other strategies can be much more efficient—
e.g. strategies that employ the statistics of the protected
features as, for example, a false-accept attack.
4 Experimental evaluation
4.1 Database and experimental method
Experiments are carried out on the CASIAv3-Interval [46]
and the IITDv1 iris database [77], where all left eye images
of the CASIAv3 database are used for training purposes
(see Section 4.2) and all five images of left and right eyes of
the IITDv1 dataset are used for performance evaluations.
Both datasets comprise good-quality NIR iris images of
size 320 × 240 pixel. Number of subjects, images, and
resulting amounts of genuine and impostor authentication
attempts are summarized in Table 1. Sample pairs of left
and right iris images of the IITDv1 database are depicted
in Fig. 4.
At pre-processing, the iris of a given sample image is
detected, un-wrapped to an enhanced rectangular texture
of 512×64 pixel, shown in Fig. 5a–c applying the weighted
adaptive Hough algorithm proposed in [78]. In the feature
extraction stage, two different iris recognition algorithms
are employed where normalized enhanced iris textures
are divided into stripes to obtain 10 one-dimensional
signals, each one averaged from the pixels of 5 adja-
cent rows (the upper 512 × 50 rows are analysed). The
first feature extraction method follows the Daugman-like
1D-LogGabor feature extraction algorithm of Masek [79]
(LG) and the second follows the algorithm proposed by
Ma et al. [80] (QSW) based on a quadratic spline wavelet.
Both feature extraction techniques generate iris-codes of
512 × 20 = 10,240 bit. Sample iris-codes generated by
both feature extraction methods are shown in Fig. 5d, e.
Custom implementations of employed segmentation and
feature extractors are freely available in the University of
Salzburg Iris Toolkit (USIT) [81]. For further details on
the employed feature extraction algorithms, the reader is
referred to [10].
In accordance with IS ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 [82], bio-
metric performance is evaluated in terms of genuine
match rate (GMR), false non-match rate (FNMR), false
match rate (FMR), and equal error rate (EER). In addition,
for the proposed fuzzy vault schemes, we estimate average
Table 1 Overview of employed databases, corresponding
number of subjects, iris images, and the resulting number of
genuine and impostor comparisons
Set Database Subjects Images Gen. Imp.
Training CASIAv3a 198 1334 4295 19,503
Evaluation IITDv1b 224 2240 2240 24,976
Note that the genuine and impostor scores have been derived following the
recommendations of Mansfield and Wayman [86]
aLeft eyes
bLeft and right eyes
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Fig. 5 Iris recognition processing chain. a Iris image. b Iris detection.
c Normalized iris texture. d Pre-processed iris texture. e, f Iris-codes of
applied feature extractor for sample image 001-02 of the IITDv1
database
genuine decoding time (GDT) and average impostor
decoding time (IDT) and provided brute-force security
(BFS) in bits. All experiments were performed on a single
core of an Intel Core i7-3610QM CPU with 3.2 GHz on a
standard workstation with sufficient RAM.
Its resistance to recovery attacks, i.e. the effort for an
imposter given a vault record to recover the original
feature sets or the secret polynomial, represents a funda-
mental aspect of a fuzzy vault implementation. Generally,
the fuzzy vault can be attacked by a brute-force attack,
where the attacker repeatedly samples k points from the
vault and tries to interpolate the secret polynomial from
these. The expected number of attempts of this attack can
be estimated by combinatorial means [83]. In contrast, the
false-accept attack exploits the specific distribution of the
biometric features, by repeatedly simulating verifications
employing features of randomly chosen (real) iris-codes.
The success probability of the false-accept attack is equal
to the FMR provided by the employed parameter set-
ting. In order to optimize the success rate, the attacker
can deviate from the parameters used in actual operation;
however, in the proposed scheme, the number of decoding
iterations is the only parameter that is not already fixed at
the time of enrolment. It has been proven in [68] that the
expected number of decoding attempts of the false-accept
attack is minimized for using one iteration. Moreover, it
has been shown that an attacker’s success probability is
maximized by using simple polynomial interpolation as
opposed to using a Reed-Solomon decoder. Hence, we
report the security in terms of false-accept security (FA
security) using this optimal strategy.
Estimating high security levels assumes sharp estima-
tions of FMRs when they are close to zero. In biomet-
ric systems with deterministic verification algorithm, the
FMR can only be estimated down to the magnitude of
1/I, where I is the number of impostor verifications per-
formed in the evaluation. However, the verification of our
implementation is probabilistic as soon as the unlock-
ing set contains more than k points. This property allows
us to give heuristic estimates of FMRs that are much
smaller than 1/I: For each single impostor verification,
we compute the success probability based on the size of
the unlocking set and the number of correct points con-
tained, and finally, we estimate the FMR as the mean over
all verifications. For details, we refer to [68].
4.2 Training stage
In the training stage ω, the number of genuine elements
in the unlocking set is employed as comparison score
between genuine and impostor pairs of feature sets. Since
biometric cryptosystems should be operated at reason-
able low FMRs, configurations which achieve the highest
GMRs at a zero FMR are preferred. Biometric perfor-
mance in terms of GMR at a zero FMR for different values
of h andw is shown in Table 2. Feature blocks are obtained
from the uppermost h adjacent rows of iris-codes bits
originating from inner bands of the iris, i.e. the number of
blocks is estimated as K = 512/w for all configurations.
Two configurations are identified as optimal, h = 10 and
w = 16 as well as h = 10 and w = 32. Note that the train-
ing step is performed on a disjoint dataset where a single
instance, i.e. iris image, is used per subject to calculate ω
between pairs feature sets.
4.3 Performance estimation
Sample pairs of left and right iris images of the evaluation
dataset are shown in Fig. 4. In the baseline systems,
Table 2 Biometric performance in terms of GMR (%) at zero FMR
for both feature extractors for different parameter settings
obtained in the training for left eyes of the CASIAv3 database
(settings considered as optimal are marked bold)
h w LG QSW h w LG QSW
8 64 74.7381 82.9336 8 16 92.4796 94.0861
10 64 85.4016 93.0617 10 16 95.7159 95.9721
12 64 90.3609 93.7602 12 16 94.4820 95.6228
14 64 89.9651 92.7590 14 16 93.5274 94.5518
8 32 88.7311 94.1793 8 8 89.4063 88.9872
10 32 94.2724 96.6007 10 8 90.3143 89.9418
12 32 94.9476 95.8789 12 8 89.9185 89.7555
14 32 93.0617 95.2503 14 8 87.8463 88.4284
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HD-based dissimilarity score are estimated, where ±8
circular bit shifts are performed to obtain a minimum
HD. For both feature extraction methods, Fig. 7 visual-
izes the probability of mis-matching bits between gen-
uine iris-code comparisons. Similar typical two-dome pat-
tern of unstable bits are clearly visible for both feature
extractors. Obtained biometric performance is summa-
rized in Table 3 and Fig. 6. As expected, a sum-rule-based
score-level fusion of comparison scores between iris-code
obtained from both iris images significantly improves bio-
metric performance, yielding EERs below 0.5 %. Note that,
in the context of score-level fusion, using the sum-rule
with proper normalization, which is implicitly provided
due to the use of a single feature extraction per fusion,
has been observed to result in competitive performance
[8]. Table 4 shows obtained biometric performance after
applying the proposed transform for different parame-
ter settings. Again, a sum-rule-based fusion of ω scores
across all iris-code blocks is performed for using both iris
images. On the one hand, we observe that the set-based
representation does not affect (or might even improve)
the biometric performance in case a single iris is used. On
the other hand, if both irises are employed, a sum-rule-
based fusion of HD-based scores reveals better biometric
performance, compared to the proposed representation.
For the single-instance scenario (using iris images of the
left eye), the obtained GMRs and corresponding FMRs,
provided security, GDTs, and IDTs for different polyno-
mial degrees k are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 for the
LG and QSW feature extraction, respectively. According
relations between FNMR and FMR are plotted in Fig. 8.
Note that scales for FNMR and FMRhave been adjusted to
improve visibility. As can be observed, the biometric per-
formance of both unprotected baseline systems is either
maintained or slightly improved. Moreover, for best per-
forming configurations, with respect to the polynomial
degree k, GDTs and IDTs are significantly smaller than 1 s.
Focusing on the proposed multi-biometric fuzzy vault,
the probabilities of mismatching bits shown in Fig. 7 con-
firm the soundness of the proposed selection of iris-code
parts. Obtained performance for both feature extractors
using different configurations is summarized in Tables 7
Table 3 Baseline performance in terms of GMR at zero FMR and
EER of the original unprotected systems estimating HD-scores of
left eyes (top) and score-level fusion of both eyes (bottom) on
IITDv1 database







Fig. 6 ROC curves of the original unprotected systems estimating HD
scores of the left eyes and score-level fusion of both eyes on IITDv1
database
and 8, respectively. Compared to obtained performance
rates for a sum-rule-based fusion of ω scores across
all iris-code blocks shown in Table 4, the presented
fusion strategy clearly improves recognition accuracy.
According FNMRs and FMRs are plotted in Fig. 9. As
can be observed, biometric performance is significantly
improved for multi-biometric fuzzy vaults achieving bet-
ter rates than according baseline systems, which confirms
that the proposed fusion retains highly discriminative
feature sets. In addition, decoding times increase only
sightly due to the compact representation of fused feature
sets. By comparing relations between FNMRs and FMRs
of single-iris and multi-iris fuzzy vaults, cf. Figures 8
and 9, it can be observed that, for reasonable values of k,
both rates significantly decrease across all configurations.
For chosen parameters h = 10 and w = 16, 32, the vault
size is estimated as 512(h + 1 + log2(512/w)). For single-
and multi-iris vaults, this results in 512 × 16 = 8192 and
512× 15 = 7680 bits for w = 16 and w = 32, respectively.
Hence, compared to the original 512 × 20 bit iris-
codes, resulting vault sizes are even smaller, since only the
upper (more discriminative) half of the original iris-code
Table 4 Biometric performance in terms of GMR (%) at zero FMR
and EER (%) and privacy protection in terms of l and  provided
by the employed transform for both feature extractors for
different parameter settings obtained for left eyes and a
score-level fusion of both eyes on the IITDv1 database (h = 10)
Algorithm Iris w GMR@FMR=0 (%) EER (%) l 
LG
Left
16 93.6294 1.705 8.68 ∼ 248
32 93.5972 1.691 17.57 ∼ 2127
Both
16 94.3694 1.161 8.68 ∼ 248
32 94.2793 1.425 17.56 ∼ 2127
QSW
Left
16 86.2613 1.835 10.71 ∼ 250
32 85.7786 2.255 21.44 ∼ 2130
Both
16 87.0270 1.350 10.72 ∼ 250
32 86.5315 1.485 21.45 ∼ 2130
Rathgeb et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:26 Page 11 of 16
Table 5 Performance of the iris fuzzy vault in terms of GMR, FMR,
FA-security, GDT, and IDT in relation to the polynomial degree k,
applying the LG feature extraction with w = 16 (top) and w = 32
(bottom) for left eyes of the IITDv1 database
k GMR (%) FMR (%) FA-sec. (bits) GDT (sec) IDT (sec)
4 98.4375 0.02001920 20.8021 49.539 0.978
6 97.7232 0.00800769 27.3634 9.247 0.617
8 97.0089 0.00800769 32.1446 3.330 0.460
10 96.0714 0.00400384 36.8344 1.648 0.366
12 94.8661 0.00400384 41.5671 0.973 0.313
16 92.0982 0 51.2525 0.488 0.246
24 83.8393 0 71.7633 0.234 0.181
32 71.7857 0 94.1555 0.169 0.152
4 98.6607 0.0240231 17.6631 65.286 1.267
6 98.3929 0.0200192 25.0975 9.683 0.577
8 97.5446 0.0160154 30.41 3.440 0.418
10 97.0089 0.0120115 35.0868 1.692 0.345
12 96.1161 0.00800769 39.7419 1.006 0.294
16 93.9286 0 49.2163 0.477 0.218
24 86.3393 0 69.0849 0.229 0.163
32 75.9375 0 90.5816 0.158 0.135
Table 6 Performance of the iris fuzzy vault in terms of GMR, FMR,
FA-security, GDT, and IDT in relation to the polynomial degree k,
applying the QSW feature extraction with w = 16 (top) and
w = 32 (bottom) for left eyes of the IITDv1 database
k GMR (%) FMR (%) FA-sec. (bits) GDT (sec) IDT (sec)
4 97.9911 0.0120115 20.5745 72.571 1.741
6 97.0536 0.00400384 27.5663 10.906 1.016
8 95.8929 0.00400384 32.2375 4.034 0.743
10 94.4643 0.00400384 36.8065 2.103 0.606
12 92.5893 0.00400384 41.4282 1.329 0.530
16 88.1696 0 50.8645 0.701 0.423
24 75.2679 0 70.5884 0.372 0.333
32 59.8214 0 91.6024 0.270 0.252
4 98.2143 0.0600577 17.111 71.130 1.641
6 97.7679 0.0240231 24.9017 12.898 1.010
8 96.875 0.0120115 30.5012 4.568 0.724
10 95.8482 0.0120115 34.9417 2.285 0.598
12 94.8214 0.00400384 39.2536 1.413 0.489
16 90.8929 0.00400384 47.9585 0.707 0.396
24 80.8036 0 66.0467 0.361 0.322
32 66.5179 0 85.2412 0.268 0.250
Fig. 7 Heatmaps illustrating the probability of mis-matching bits
between genuine iris-code comparisons for both feature extraction
methods on the IITDv1 database
is employed. As aforementioned, vault sizes may be fur-
ther reduced based on an maximum observed number of
feature elements in extracted point sets.
4.4 Security analysis
For chosen parameter settings, the average number of
unique feature elements per iris-code block, l, and the
corresponding amount of different sequences of iris-code
columns which result in a single set of feature values, ,
according to Eq. 1, is summarized in Table 4. The large
values of  indicate a certain degree of irreversibility,
Table 7 Performance of the multi-iris fuzzy vault in terms of
GMR, FMR, FA-security, GDT, and IDT in relation to the polynomial
degree k, applying the LG feature extraction with w = 16 (top)
and w = 32 (bottom) using left and right eyes of the IITDv1
database
k GMR (%) FMR (%) FA-sec. (bits) GDT (sec) IDT (sec)
4 99.2411 0.0120155 20.2336 111.180 1.445
6 98.6161 0.00800769 28.6599 20.131 0.926
8 97.6786 0.00400384 34.6343 6.935 0.702
10 96.9643 0 40.0863 3.301 0.562
12 96.25 0 45.5598 1.944 0.476
16 93.7946 0 56.7434 0.887 0.385
24 86.2054 0 80.3626 0.376 0.270
32 73.6161 0 106.131 0.268 0.240
4 99.4196 0.0840807 16.7213
6 99.0179 0.0160154 24.6816 21.535 0.869
8 98.5268 0.00800769 31.6944 7.284 0.654
10 97.9464 0.00800769 37.3526 3.479 0.536
12 97.1875 0.00400384 42.4997 1.970 0.449
16 95.4911 0 52.7801 0.895 0.352
24 88.7946 0 74.3242 0.375 0.247
32 78.4821 0 97.5726 0.254 0.224
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Table 8 Performance of the multi-iris fuzzy vault in terms of
GMR, FMR, FA-security, GDT, and IDT in relation to the polynomial
degree k, applying the QSW feature extraction with w = 16 (top)
and w = 32 (bottom) using left and right eyes of the IITDv1
database
k GMR (%) FMR (%) FA-sec. (bits) GDT (sec) IDT (sec)
4 98.9286 0.00800769 20.0627 96.125 2.319
6 97.7232 0.00400384 29.1706 17.313 1.459
8 96.6071 0.00400384 35.8048 6.238 1.077
10 95.0446 0 41.486 3.056 0.871
12 93.4375 0 47.1429 1.813 0.746
16 86.6071 0 58.6874 0.910 0.532
24 71.6518 0 82.9584 0.464 0.399
32 51.4732 0 109.121 0.330 0.314
4 99.4196 0.212204 16.378 106.957 2.156
6 98.9286 0.0160154 24.3893 21.143 1.501
8 97.6339 0.00800769 31.8845 7.280 1.142
10 97.1429 0.00400384 38.1659 3.423 0.784
12 95.5357 0.00400384 43.5714 1.964 0.683
16 91.6964 0 54.0004 0.998 0.533
24 79.0625 0 75.5451 0.476 0.402
32 60.4018 0 98.4993 0.340 0.312
which will hamper a systematic reconstruction of iris-
code blocks from the proposed set-based representation,
even if an attacker succeeds in unlocking the vault. Amore
thorough analysis of potential reconstruction attacks is
beyond the scope of this work.
For all employed parameter settings h = 10,w =
16, 32, k = 4, ..., 32, and 256 ≤ |P′| ≤ |P| ≤ 512, one
can verify experimentally that the probability of Eq. 2
never becomes larger than 2−155. This clearly shows that
the cross-matching attack from [70] can be effectively
prevented.
We estimate the security against recovery attacks by the
expected number of decoding attempts that an attacker
has to perform with a Lagrange-based decoder after hav-
ing built the unlocking set using a query template [68]. In
this way, our notion of security is a measure of resistance
against a certain false-accept attack by also accounting
for a decoding complexity. However, it is important to
note that there may be more efficient strategies for an
attacker to perform. For example, the attacker may rely
on a Guruswami-Sudan-based decoder as in the verifi-
cation protocol or on a completely different (currently
unknown) strategy. However, we stress that the security
achieved with a Guruswami-Sudan-based decoder cannot
Fig. 8 Biometric performance in terms of FNMR and FMR in relation to reasonable values of the polynomial degree k for optimal parameter settings
for both feature extractors using left eyes of the IITDv1 database
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Fig. 9 Biometric performance in terms of FNMR and FMR in relation to reasonable values of the polynomial degree k for optimal parameter settings
for both feature extractors using left and right eyes of the IITDv1 database
be estimated beyond the bound of 215 times the decod-
ing complexity—even if the true security is significantly
higher. The method from [68] allows to estimate a higher
false-accept security; but, the reader should be aware
that the resulting security estimates are heuristic false-
accept security estimates. Yet, these estimates are still
much more realistic and plausible than security estimates
against brute-force attacks. Figure 10 compares obtained
GMRs versus the security levels, for different parame-
ter settings of the proposed (multi-)biometric fuzzy vault
schemes for both employed feature extraction algorithms.
Firstly, we observe that security levels provided by iris bio-
metric fuzzy vaults using a single iris appear satisfactory.
For GMRs above 90 %, security levels of approximately
50 bits are obtained. Secondly, the use of both irises is
shown to be beneficial. On the one hand, it improves
biometric performance: at a fixed security level, higher
GMRs are obtained when using both eyes; on the other
hand, privacy protection is increased: for a fixed GMR,
higher security levels are achieved; Hence, depending on
the chosen size of k, recognition accuracy and/or privacy
protection is improved. At operation points which achieve
reasonable GMRs of approximately 90 and 95 %, the secu-
rity level is increased from 50 to almost 70 bits and 40 to
50 bits, respectively.
Another very important security aspect concerns the
risk of correlation attacks on two or more vault records
of the same user. Since we use the improved fuzzy
vault scheme, which effectively uses all finite field ele-
ments as vault points [69], the correlation attack from
[66] cannot be applied. On the other hand, there are
specific correlation attacks against the improved fuzzy
vault scheme based on solving systems of polynomial
equations [84] or deploying the extended Euclidean algo-
rithm [70]. However, these attacks only work if in both
vault records the features are represented by the same
finite field elements, and, hence, are prevented by our
use of a record-specific permutation σ of the field
elements [68].
5 Conclusions
The link between individuals and their biometric (physi-
ological) characteristics is considered strong and perma-
nent, particularly for iris [3]. Therefore, iris-codes must
be protected in order to safeguard individuals’ privacy
and biometric systems’ security. Albeit this is rarely the
case in operational systems, favourable capture condi-
tions (resulting in low intra-class variance) are consid-
ered a fundamental premise for biometric cryptosystems.
Consequentially, compared to conventional recognition
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Fig. 10 GMRs versus FA-security of proposed (multi) iris biometric
fuzzy vaults for both feature extraction algorithms and different
parameter settings on the IITDv1 database
systems, biometric cryptosystems suffer from a signifi-
cant decrease in biometric performance. Multi-biometric
cryptosystems, which should be designed to combine
multiple biometric characteristics at feature level [21],
might bridge the gap between biometric performance and
privacy protection [19].
The key advantages of the proposed (multi-)iris fuzzy
vault scheme can be summarized in three terms: (1) in
contrast to the vast majority of biometric cryptosystems,
the proposed system maintains biometric performance
obtained by the corresponding unprotected iris recogni-
tion system in a single- or multi-instance scenario; (2) the
suggested fusion technique combines most discriminative
information of two iris-codes to a single fuzzy vault and
key retrieval is performed based on an analysis of suit-
able decoding strategies providing fast decoding times; (3)
in contrast to existing proposals the presented (multi-)
iris fuzzy vault scheme is designed to protect iris-codes,
i.e. the protection of an iris biometric database does not
require re-enrolment registered subjects.
Furthermore, it is shown that the proposed (multi-)iris
fuzzy vault schemes obtain unrivalled security levels in
comparison to fuzzy vaults based on other biometric char-
acteristics. Even minutiae-based multi-finger fuzzy vaults
using four fingers do not achieve higher security levels
[71]. Like in the vast majority of biometric cryptosystems,
obtained decoding times may limit the system to be oper-
ated in verification mode while protected biometric tem-
plates still enable a compact storage. A security analysis
for the scenario where an adversarymight be in possession
of one iris-code prior to attacking a multi-iris fuzzy vault
might be subject to future research. Finally, we note that
the presented work is based on open-source software and
evaluated on public biometric databases, i.e. represents
fully reproducible research [85].
Acknowledgements
This work has been partially supported by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (BMBF) within the Center for Research in Security and
Privacy (CRISP).
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1da/sec – Biometrics and Internet Security Research Group, Hochschule
Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany. 2secunet Security Networks AG, Essen,
Germany.
Received: 13 January 2016 Accepted: 13 October 2016
References
1. AK Jain, A Ross, S Prabhakar, An introduction to biometric recognition.
IEEE Trans. Circ. Syst. Video Technol. 14, 4–20 (2004)
2. AK Jain, P Flynn, AA Ross, Handbook of Biometrics. (Springer, New York,
2008)
3. J Daugman, How iris recognition works. IEEE Trans. Circ. Syst. Video
Technol. 14(1), 21–30 (2004)
4. KW Bowyer, K Hollingsworth, PJ Flynn, Image understanding for iris
biometrics: a survey. Elsevier Comput. Vis. Image Underst. 110(2),
281–307 (2007)
5. A Ross, Iris recognition: the path forward. Computer. 43, 30–35 (2010)
6. A Ross, K Nandakumar, AK Jain, Handbook of Multibiometrics. (Springer,
Secaucus, NJ, USA, 2006)
7. A Ross, AK Jain, Information fusion in biometrics. Pattern Recogn. Lett. 24,
2115–2125 (2003)
8. AK Jain, B Klare, AA Ross, in In Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Biometrics 2015
(ICB’15). Guidelines for best practices in biometrics research (IEEE, 2015),
pp. 1–5
9. Unique Identification Authority of India, Aadhaar: http://uidai.gov.in/.
retrieved July, 2016. http://uidai.gov.in/
10. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, P Wild, Iris Recognition: From Segmentation to Template
Security. Advances in Information Security, vol. 59. (Springer, New York,
2013)
11. S Venugopalan, M Savvides, How to generate spoofed irises from an iris
code template. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 6, 385–395 (2011)
12. J Galbally, A Ross, M Gomez-Barrero, J Fiérrez, J Ortega-Garcia, Iris image
reconstruction from binary templates: an efficient probabilistic approach
based on genetic algorithms. Comp. Vision Image Underst. 117(10),
1512–1525 (2013)
13. S Marcel, M Nixon, SZ Li, Handbook of Biometric Anti-Spoofing. (Spring,
New York, 2014)
14. AK Jain, K Nandakumar, A Nagar, Biometric template security. EURASIP J.
Adv. Sig. Process. 2008, 1–17 (2008)
15. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable
biometrics. EURASIP J. Inf. Secur. 2011(3) (2011)
16. U Uludag, S Pankanti, S Prabhakar, AK Jain, Biometric cryptosystems:
issues and challenges. Proc. IEEE. 92(6), 948–960 (2004)
17. NK Ratha, JH Connell, RM Bolle, Enhancing security and privacy in
biometrics-based authentication systems. IBM Syst. J. 40(3), 614–634
(2001)
18. ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 Security Techniques:ISO/IEC 24745:2011. Information
Technology - Security Techniques - Biometric Information Protection
Rathgeb et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:26 Page 15 of 16
International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 2011). International
Organization for Standardization
19. K Nandakumar, AK Jain, Biometric template protection: bridging the
performance gap between theory and practice. IEEE Sig. Process. Mag. -
Spec. Issue Biom. Secur. Priv. 32(5), 1–12 (2015)
20. Y Wang, S Rane, SC Draper, P Ishwar, A theoretical analysis of
authentication, privacy, and reusability across secure biometric systems.
Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 7(6), 1825–1840 (2012)
21. A Nagar, K Nandakumar, AK Jain, Multibiometric cryptosystems based on
feature-level fusion. Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 7(1), 255–268 (2012)
22. C Rathgeb, C Busch, in New Trends and Developments in Biometrics.
Multibiometric template protection: issues and challenges (InTech, Rijeka,
2012), pp. 173–190
23. A Juels, M Sudan, in Proc. IEEE Int’l Symp. on Information Theory. A fuzzy
vault scheme (IEEE, 2002), p. 408
24. G Davida, Y Frankel, B Matt, On enabling secure applications through
off-line biometric identification. Proc. IEEE, Symp. Secur. Priv, 148–157
(1998)
25. G Davida, Y Frankel, B Matt, On the relation of error correction and
cryptography to an off line biometric based identication scheme. Proc. of
WCC99, Work. Coding Cryptogr, 129–138 (1999)
26. A Juels, M Wattenberg, in Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security. A fuzzy commitment scheme (ACM, 1999),
pp. 28–36
27. F Hao, R Anderson, J Daugman, Combining cryptography with biometrics
effectively. IEEE Trans. Comput. 55(9), 1081–1088 (2006)
28. J Bringer, H Chabanne, G Cohen, B Kindarji, G Zemor, Theoretical and
practical boundaries of binary secure sketches. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics.
Secur. 3, 673–683 (2008)
29. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): Iris Challenge
Evaluation (ICE) 2005. http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ice.cfm. (2005).
Accessed Oct 2016
30. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, Context-based biometric key-generation for iris. IET
Computer Vision (Spec. Issue Futur. Trends Biom. Process.), IET. 5(6) (2012)
31. ABJ Teoh, J Kim, Secure biometric template protection in fuzzy
commitment scheme. IEICE Electron. Express. 4(23), 724–730 (2007)
32. L Zhang, Z Sun, T Tan, S Hu, in In Proc. of the 3rd Int. Conf. on Biometrics
2009 (ICB’09) LNCS: 5558. Robust biometric key extraction based on iris
cryptosystem (Springer, 2009), pp. 1060–1070
33. ERC Kelkboom, J Breebaart, TAM Kevenaar, I Buhan, RNJ Veldhuis,
Preventing the decodability attack based cross-matching in a fuzzy
commitment scheme. Trans. Inf Forensics Secur. 6(1), 107–121 (2011)
34. E Maiorana, P Campisi, A Neri, in Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing (ICASSP’14). Iris template protection using a digital modulation
paradigm (IEEE, 2014), pp. 3759–3763
35. A Cavoukian, A Stoianov, in Biometrics: Fundamentals, Theory, and Systems.
Biometric encryption: the new breed of untraceable biometrics (Wiley,
New York, 2009)
36. A Stoianov, T Kevenaar, M van der Veen, in 2009 IEEE Toronto International
Conference on Science and Technology for Humanity (TIC-STH). Security
issues of biometric encryption (IEEE, 2009), pp. 34–39
37. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, Statistical attack against fuzzy commitment scheme. IET
Biom. 1(2), 94–104 (2012)
38. T Ignatenko, FMJ Willems, Information leakage in fuzzy commitment
schemes. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 5(2), 337–348 (2010)
39. P Failla, Y Sutcu, M Barni, in Proc. of the 12th ACMWorkshop onMultimedia
and Security. MM&Sec ’10. esketch: a privacy-preserving fuzzy commitment
scheme for authentication using encrypted biometrics (ACM, 2010),
pp. 241–246
40. K Simoens, P Tuyls, B Preneel, in Proc. of the 30th IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy. Privacy weaknesses in biometric sketches (IEEE, 2009),
pp. 188–203
41. I Buhan-Dulman, JG Merchan, E Kelkboom, in Proc. of IEEEWorkshop on
Information Forensics and Security (WIFS). Efficient strategies for playing
the indistinguishability game for fuzzy sketches (IEEE, 2010)
42. B Tams, Decodability attack against the fuzzy commitment scheme with
public feature transforms. CoRR. abs/1406.1154 (2014)
43. YJ Lee, K Bae, SJ Lee, KR Park, J Kim, in Proc. of Second Int. Conf. on
Biometrics. Biometric key binding: fuzzy vault based on iris images
(Springer, 2007), pp. 800–808
44. YJ Lee, KR Park, SJ Lee, K Bae, J Kim, A new method for generating an
invariant iris private key based on the fuzzy vault system. Trans. Syst. Man,
Cybern. Part B: Cybern. 38(5), 1302–1313 (2008)
45. Biometrics Engineering Research Center (BERC): Iris database (version 1)
(2008)
46. Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Automation: CASIA Iris Image
Database V3.0 — Interval. http://biometrics.idealtest.org (2002). Accessed
Oct 2016
47. ES Reddy, I Ramesh Babu, in 8th Int. Conf. on Computer and Information
TechnologyWorkshops, 2008. Performance of iris based hard fuzzy vault
(IEEE, 2008), pp. 248–253
48. ES Reddy, I Ramesh Babu, in Second Asia Int. Conf. onModeling Simulation
AICMS’08. Authentication using fuzzy vault based on iris textures (IEEE,
2008), pp. 361–368
49. Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Automation: CASIA Iris Image
Database V1.0. http://biometrics.idealtest.org (2002). Accessed Oct 2016
50. Multimedia University: MMU Iris Image Database. http://pesona.mmu.
edu.my/ccteo (2004). Accessed Oct 2016
51. K Nandakumar, AK Jain, in 2nd Int. Conf. on Biometrics: Theory, Applications
and Systems (BTAS’08). Multibiometric template security using fuzzy vault
(IEEE, 2008), pp. 1–6
52. AK Jain, S Prabhakar, A Ross, Fingerprint matching: data acquisition and
performance evaluation. Michigan State Univ., Tech. Rep., TR99-14 (1999)
53. M Fouad, A El Saddik, J Zhao, E Petriu, in Int. Systems Conf. (SysCon’11). A
fuzzy vault implementation for securing revocable iris templates (IEEE,
2011), pp. 491–494
54. R Álvarez Mariño, FH Álvarez, LH Encinas, A crypto-biometric scheme
based on iris-templates with fuzzy extractors. Inf. Sci. 195, 91–102 (2012)
55. S Sowkarthika, N Radha, in 7th Int. Conf. on Intelligent Systems and Control
(ISCO’13). Securing iris and fingerprint templates using fuzzy vault and
symmetric algorithm (IEEE, 2013), pp. 189–193
56. J Zuo, NK Ratha, JH Connel, in Proc. of the 19th Int. Conf. on Pattern
Recognition 2008 (ICPR’08). Cancelable iris biometric (IEEE, 2008), pp. 1–4
57. S Kanade, D Petrovska-Delacretaz, B Dorizzi, in Proc. of the IEEE Computer
Society Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR ’09.
Cancelable iris biometrics and using error correcting codes to reduce
variability in biometric data (IEEE, 2009), pp. 120–127
58. J Hämmerle-Uhl, E Pschernig, A Uhl, in Proc. of the 12th Int. Information
Security Conf. (ISC’09). LNCS, ed. by P Samarati, M Yung, F Martinelli, and CA
Ardagna. Cancelable iris biometrics using block re-mapping and image
warping, vol. 5735 (Springer, New York, 2009), pp. 135–142
59. JK Pillai, VM Patel, R Chellappa, NK Ratha, Secure and robust iris
recognition using random projections and sparse representations. Trans.
Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 33(9), 1877–1893 (2011)
60. C Rathgeb, C Busch, Cancelable multi-biometrics: mixing iris-codes based
on adaptive bloom filters. Comput. Secur. 42, 1–12 (2014)
61. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, P Wild, in Iris Biometrics. Advances in Information Security.
Cancelable iris biometrics, vol. 59 (Springer, New York, 2013), pp. 223–231
62. A Juels, M Sudan, A fuzzy vault scheme. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 38(2),
237–257 (2006)
63. TC Clancy, N Kiyavash, DJ Lin, in Proc. ACM SIGMMWorkshop on Biometrics
Methods and Applications. WBMA ’03. Secure smartcard-based fingerprint
authentication (ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2003), pp. 45–52
64. K Nandakumar, AK Jain, S Pankanti, Fingerprint-based fuzzy vault:
implementation and performance. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2(4),
744–757 (2007)
65. A Nagar, K Nandakumar, AK Jain, A hybrid biometric cryptosystem for
securing fingerprint minutiae templates. Pattern Recogn. Lett. 31,
733–741 (2010)
66. WJ Scheirer, TE Boult, in Proc. of Biometrics Symp. Cracking fuzzy vaults and
biometric encryption (IEEE, 2007), pp. 1–6
67. A Kholmatov, B Yanikoglu, in Proc. SPIE. Realization of correlation attack
against the fuzzy vault scheme, vol. 6819 (SPIE, 2008)
68. B Tams, P Miha˘ilescu, A Munk, Security considerations in minutiae-based
fuzzy vaults. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 10(5), 985–998 (2015)
69. Y Dodis, R Ostrovsky, L Reyzin, A Smith, Fuzzy extractors: how to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM J. Comput. 38(1),
97–139 (2008)
70. J Merkle, B Tams, Security of the improved fuzzy vault scheme in the
presence of record multiplicity (full version). CoRR (2013). https://arxiv.
org/abs/1312.5225. Accessed Oct 2016
Rathgeb et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:26 Page 16 of 16
71. B Tams, Unlinkable minutiae-based fuzzy vault for multiple fingerprints.
IET Biom. 5(3), 170–180 (2016). IET Digital Library
72. S Gao, in Communications, Information and Network Security, V.Bhargava,
H.V.Poor, V.Tarokh, and S.Yoon. A new algorithm for decoding
reed-solomon codes (Dordrecht, 2002), pp. 55–68
73. V Guruswami, M Sudan, Improved decoding of reed-solomon and
algebraic-geometric codes. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory. 45, 1757–1767 (1998)
74. M-H Lim, ABJ Teoh, J Kim, Biometric feature-type transformation: making
templates compatible for template protection. IEEE Sig. Process. Mag.
32(5), 77–87 (2015)
75. R Cappelli, A Lumini, D Maio, D Maltoni, Fingerprint image reconstruction
from standard templates. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 29(9),
1489–1503 (2007)
76. W Dong, Z Sun, T Tan, Iris matching based on personalized weight map.
IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 33(9), 1744–1757 (2011)
77. Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (IITD): IITD Iris Database version 1.0
(2007). http://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/~csajaykr/IITD/Database_Iris.
htm. Accessed Oct 2016
78. A Uhl, PWild, in Proc. 5th Int’l Conf. on Biometrics. Weighted adaptive hough
and ellipsopolar transforms for real-time iris segmentation, (2012), pp. 1–8
79. L Masek, Recognition of human iris patterns for biometric identification.
Master’s thesis. (University of Western Australia, 2003)
80. L Ma, T Tan, Y Wang, D Zhang, Efficient iris recognition by characterizing
key local variations. IEEE Trans. Image Process. 13(6), 739–750 (2004)
81. USIT – University of Salzburg Iris Toolkit. http://www.wavelab.at/sources/
Rathgeb12e. version 1.0.x. Accessed Oct 2016
82. ISO/IEC TC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics: ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006, Information
Technology – Biometric Performance Testing and Reporting – Part 1:
Principles and Framework. International Organization for Standardization
and International Electrotechnical Committee (2006). International
Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical
Committee
83. P Miha˘ilescu, A Munk, B Tams, in Proc. of BIOSIG. The fuzzy vault for
fingerprints is vulnerable to brute force attack (IEEE, 2009), pp. 43–54
84. M Blanton, M Aliasgari, Analysis of reusability of secure sketches and fuzzy
extractors. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 8(9), 1433–1445 (2013)
85. P Vandewalle, J Kovacevic, M Vetterli, Reproducible research in signal
processing - What, why, and how. IEEE Sig. Process. Mag. 26(3), 37–47
(2009)
86. AJ Mansfield, JL Wayman, Best practices in testing and reporting
performance of biometric devices. Technical report. U.K. Goverment
Biometrics Working Group (August 2002)
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
